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INTRODUCTION
The popularity of Alternative Dispute Resolution has increased
gradually as "courts have abandoned their traditional hostility towards
arbitration and openly embraced agreements to arbitrate."1 Still, many
express concern about the consequences for those unsuspecting parties
who agree to waive their right to a judicial forum and submit all dis-
putes, including those that arise under statutory law, to binding arbitra-
tion. Until recently, American jurisprudence had yet to see whether
arbitration agreements, governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
might be applied constitutionally in an employment context. Following
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/John-
son Lane Corp.,2 there were numerous reservations about the FAA's
section 1 language, which excludes specific employment contracts. The
Supreme Court, however, clarified this issue in Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams.'
The Court decided Circuit City on March 21, 2001. After a great
deal of speculation by federal courts, the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify a number of uncertainties. Of greatest importance, it is now clear
that agreements to arbitrate can be enforced under the FAA.4 In support
of this holding, the Supreme Court rejected the supposition that the
advantages of arbitration disappear when transferred to the employment
context.5 Therefore, the only parties that are excluded under the lan-
I. Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993); see also Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989).
2. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
4. See Arthur D. Rutkowski & Barbara Lang Rutkowski, U.S. Supreme Court Decision
Gives New Life to Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Discrimination Claims in an Employment
Setting, 16 No. 4 EMP. L. UPDATE 1 (Apr. 2001); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-32 (1991). While the Court in Gilmer does not state the proposition
clearly, it does suggest that employment contracts were not intended to be excluded from the
FAA. Id.
5. See Rutkowski, supra note 4.
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guage of the statute are seaman, railroad employees, and transportation
workers.6 While on the surface the conflict appears to have been
resolved, there are still numerous questions that remain unanswered.
For a better understanding of the issues that may arise given the
Court's decision in Circuit City, it is instructive to look at the law as it
has developed outside of the employment context, particularly the issues
that have been debated and argued over consumer contracts. Arguably,
employees may benefit from worthwhile arguments that have been made
and won by consumers facing similar arbitration clauses within con-
sumer contracts.
Three issues of particular importance will be considered. The first
focuses on the constitutionality of the arbitration clause itself. Certainly,
many employees will continue to argue that their constitutional right to
due process is abridged with the loss of formalities associated with a
jury trial. How will courts respond under Circuit City? What has devel-
oped pertaining to consumer law?
The second section will focus on consent issues as they have devel-
oped under consumer law. What constitutes voluntary consent? In eval-
uating consumer contract law, what are the most prominent arguments
made by consumers? Can predictions be made for employees who may
face similar problems in the future? The final section will show that
even after Circuit City these two critical arbitration issues remain unan-
swered. To provide the proper framework for this Comment, it is neces-
sary to take a brief look at the basics of arbitration, the history of the
FAA, and the facts of Circuit City.
THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE
Under Federal law, arbitration is considered a matter of contract
between two parties.7 Congressional legislation in this area suggests
that there is a liberal federal policy toward the enforcement of contrac-
tual arbitration agreements. These policies are rooted in the basics of
contract law. Very simply, if two parties bargain for goods or services
and agree to arbitrate all disputes that arise under the terms of the con-
tract, those parties should be bound to that agreement.8 The FAA gov-
erns disputes that arise in this context. Likewise, courts have expressed
that a liberal construction of the FAA's scope should be implemented,
6. See Ross Runkle, After Circuit City - Arbitration of Individual Employment Disputes,
available at http://www.lawmemo.com/emp/articles/circuitcity.htm (Nov. 11, 2001).
7. A. Daniel Woska, Arbitration Clauses Added to Consumer Contracts: Why They Are Not
Enforceable, 17 GPSOLo 40, 41 (2000).
8. Id.
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thus reinforcing the court's decision in Circuit City.9 As a result, it is
now certain that the FAA governs employment contracts.
In drafting an arbitration clause, several goals should be kept in
mind. First, the clause should be sufficiently detailed to apprise con-
sumers and employees of their legal rights and to disclose aspects of the
arbitration process. 10 Second, the language used should be both clear
and plain. ' Finally, the clause should be fair.' 2 Each of these elements
help facilitate the arbitration process and ensure an arbitral agreement
that is both fair and proper. It has also been suggested that the party
drafting the agreement refer to the FAA in the text of the clause.' 3 This
ensures that courts will enforce the agreement for which the parties bar-
gained under the FAA.' 4 The arbitration agreement itself will frame the
types of disputes that may arise in the future between the parties
involved.' 5
One scholar comments that the wise lawyer should recognize two
distinct moments when disputes over arbitration agreements are likely to
occur.' 6 The first of these takes place pre-arbitration when, for example,
one party moves to compel the other to submit to the terms of an arbitra-
tion provision.' 7 The second instance arises post-arbitration when one
party moves to vacate the arbitrator's award.' 8 These two examples are
not exhaustive; there are a variety of other instances when a dispute
could arise. These two examples simply represent the most frequent dis-
putes. The basis of a party's argument usually stems from the fairness
of either the proceedings or the clause itself.' 9 When aware of the
problems that may arise, a better arbitration clause can be drafted with
the hope of curbing some of the process's negative effects.
The incorporation of arbitration clauses into contractual agreements
ultimately involves both positive and negative aspects. After balancing
the attributes associated with the process, the clauses are generally more
beneficial than they are harmful to the parties involved. The most glar-
ing concern over the use of an arbitral rather than judicial forum is the
9. Id.
10. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration Clause: Drafting and
Implementation Issues Which Should be Considered by a Consumer Lender, SF 81 ALI-ABA 215,
217 (2001).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Jeffrey J. Mayer & Theodore W. Seitz, Recognizing and Understanding Consent Issues in
Arbitration, 79 MICH. Bus. L.J. 504, 505 (2000).
14. Id.
15. Runkle, supra note 6, at 2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Mayer & Seitz, supra note 13, at 504.
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inferiority of the arbitral proceedings, particularly the lack of a jury
trial.20 This concerns many individuals who fear infringement upon or
waiver of their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
Another serious concern facing parties is the lack of safeguards
essential to the legal system.2' These safeguards form the foundation of
traditional adjudication and provide for continued faith in the judicial
system. For instance, discovery is an invaluable aspect of litigation that
is severely limited in the arbitral forum. When faced with a final judg-
ment from an arbitrator, only limited discovery is allowed.22 Further-
more, the proceedings are not governed by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, nor is the possibility of class certification available after one
has agreed to arbitrate a claim. 23 There are no required written deci-
sions, fewer available remedies, 24 and because the arbitrator's decision
is essentially final, there is no possibility of appeal.25
While there are numerous concerns about the downsides to arbitra-
tion, the process does in fact resemble traditional adjudication in very
basic ways. The process "involves adversary presentations of proof and
reasoned argument to an arbitrator. '26 These fundamental qualities form
the basics of any proceeding, be it arbitral or judicial. Moreover, unlike
the judicial forum, arbitral parties are given the opportunity to control
the procedure and have a say in the remedies available depending on the
type of dispute.27 The time-honored form of courtroom adjudication
does not allow for such informality, expediency, or efficiency in the pro-
cess. 28 Based on several of these theories, strong arguments can be
made in favor of arbitration agreements. Yet, regardless of whether one
favors such clauses, if the parties agree to the terms of the clause, a court
will likely enforce it under the FAA.
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 in an attempt to thwart judicial
animosity towards arbitration agreements.29 As the Supreme Court
20. Id. at 505.
21. See Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. Rnv. 81 (1992).
22. Id.
23. Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer
Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1234 (2001).
24. Id.
25. See Brunet, supra note 21, at 82, 86-87.
26. Id. at 82.
27. See Mayer & Seitz, supra note 13, at 507.
28. See Brunet, supra note 21, at 82.
29. Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001); see also Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
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stated in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,° the purpose of the
Act was to "reverse longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agree-
ments that had existed at English Common law and had been adopted by
American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts. ' 31 By placing both arbitration clauses and
contracts on the same level, arbitration law has become enveloped by the
underlying rules of contract law. According to the Supreme Court, any
doubts that arise concerning the scope of arbitrable issues will be
resolved in favor of arbitration.32 Therefore, the terms of written con-
tracts for which parties bargain are likely to be upheld.33 Since its enact-
ment by Congress, the FAA has been applied to contracts for the
interstate sale of goods, construction contracts, service contracts, and
partnership agreements. 34 Employment contracts now fall within the
scope of the Act as well.
Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA are the most controversial. They read:
SECTION 1. "MARITIME TRANSACTIONS" AND "COMMERCE" DEFINED;
EXCEPTIONS TO OPERATION OF TITLE
"Maritime transaction", as herein defined, means charter parties, bills
of lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies
furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other matters
in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would be
embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce", as herein
defined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign
nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of
Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between
any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the
District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce.35
SECTION 2. VALIDITY, IRREVOCABILITY, AND ENFORCEMENT OF
AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidenc-
ing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a contro-
versy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the
30. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
31. Id. at 24.
32. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); see
also Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 10, at 233.
33. See Smith, supra note 23, at 1197.
34. Scott R. Swier, The Tenuous Tale of the Terrible Termites: The Federal Arbitration Act
and the Court's Decision to Interpret Section Two in the Broadest Manner: Allied Bruce
Terminex Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 41 S.D. L. REV. 131 (1996).
35. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (emphasis added).
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refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.36
The terms of these two sections have caused a great deal of speculation
and doubt about the statute's outer limits. Despite the lack of textual
and historical support, one scholar notes that the Court has "greatly
expanded the preemptive scope of the statute . . . .,, More recently,
Circuit City expanded the Act even further to encompass contracts of
employment. 3
8
Originally, the FAA was interpreted as a procedural device to be
used by federal courts in the enforcement of arbitration agreements in
federal question and diversity cases.39 It became possible, however, for
federal courts to enforce arbitration clauses in diversity cases that other-
wise may have been void under a state statute if the proceedings had
been brought in state court."n This is precisely the type of situation that
the Erie Doctrine sought to prevent. Therefore, the Supreme Court has
held that the enforcement of an arbitration provision may affect substan-
tive rights as well as procedural rights.4 ' Now arbitration agreements
may fall under the Erie Doctrine, in which case state substantive law
will apply in diversity cases. 2
This issue was argued fiercely for several years because some
believed the Act distorted Congress's original intent.4 3 In a stern
Supreme Court dissent, Justice Black claimed that application of the
FAA in state courts would be "statutory manipulation" of the framers'
intent.44 Almost thirty years later, Justice O'Connor noted that
"although arbitration is a worthy alternative to litigation," the Court's
belief that substantive rights are infringed upon is an "exercise in judi-
cial revisionism [that] goes too far."45 Regardless of the numerous con-
cerns and powerful dissents exhibited in recent years, the FAA continues
to be applied in both state and federal courts. Some have likewise noted
36. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
37. Megan Davis, From Procedural Law to Preemption: The Supreme Court's
Transformation of the Federal Arbitration Act, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 169 (1996).
38. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
39. Davis, supra note 37, at 176-77.
40. See id. at 178-79.
41. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act affected not only the procedural rights of the parties, but substantive rights
as well).
42. See id.
43. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
44. Id. at 416 (Black, J., dissenting).
45. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 36 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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that, "[a]ll the FAA does is enforce an arbitration clause that is other-
wise valid and bargained for under state contract law."46
A REVIEW OF CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC. V. ADAMS
In Circuit City the Supreme Court conclusively determined the
scope of the FAA's section 1 contract exemption.47 In a 5-4 decision,
with two powerful dissents, the Court narrowed the exemption from
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" to transportation
workers. 48 After an in-depth analysis of the terms of the statutory text,
the Court found this rationale to be the only reasonable reading of Con-
gress's exclusionary clause.
FACTS
In applying for a job at the Petitioner's place of business, Circuit
City Stores, Inc., the Respondent, Saint Clair Adams, signed an employ-
ment application. The signed application included a provision which
stated that the Respondent would resolve "any and all previously unas-
serted claims, disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to [the]
application or candidacy for employment, employment and/or cessation
of employment with Circuit City, exclusively by final and binding arbi-
tration before a neutral Arbitrator."49 Upon signing, Adams was hired as
a sales counselor at a Circuit City Store located in Santa Rosa,
California.5"
After two years of employment, Adams filed several discrimination
claims against Circuit City in California state court.5 These claims
included violations of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act,
as well as other general tort law claims.52 In response, Circuit City filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia, seeking to enjoin the state court proceedings and compel arbitra-
tion of Adams's claims. The District Court concluded that Adams must
submit all claims against Circuit City to arbitration.53
Adams appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth
Circuit adhered to its precedent and found that that the FAA could not
46. Davis, supra note 37, at 182.
47. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 109-10.
50. Id. at 110.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 105.
53. Id.
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be applied to the employment contract between Adams and Circuit
City.54 Circuit City filed for certiorari arguing that every other Court of
Appeals was in direct opposition with the Ninth Circuit on this issue.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear arguments and resolve the
dispute.56
RATIONALE
While in the past the Supreme Court dealt mainly with the language
of section 2 of the FAA, specifically the "involving commerce" termi-
nology 57 here the Court quickly narrowed its analysis to the section 1
exemptions. 8 Originally, the exemption issue was raised over a securi-
ties registration application in Gilmer but the court was able to reach a
decision in that case without having to interpret the scope of the exemp-
tions because the application was not an employment contract. 9
The Circuit City court concluded that the issue reserved in Gilmer
would be resolved based on the facts before it.6° Adams argued initially
that the section 1 exclusion need not be addressed because an employ-
ment contract is not a "contract evidencing a transaction involving inter-
state commerce" under section 2 of the FAA. 61 The Court deflated this
argument by noting that the section 1 exemption would not have been
necessary had contracts of employment fallen outside the scope of the
FAA under the section 2 language. 62 The Court stated that the section 1
exemption would have been "pointless" and inconsistent with the
Court's holding in both Gilmer and Allied-Bruce.63 Adams continued to
54. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 105 (2001); see also Craft v. Campbell
Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the FAA does not apply to
employment contracts).
55. Id. at 109; see also, e.g., McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 575-76 (10th Cir.
1998); O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply
Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1265, 1270-72
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc. 87 F.3d 745, 747-48 (5th Cir. 1996);
Asplundh Tree Co. v. Bates 71, F.3d 592, 596-601 (6th Cir. 1995); Erving v. Va. Squires
Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2nd Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. DuPont 443 F.2d 783, 785
(1st Cir. 1971); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. & Mach. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 450 (3d
Cir. 1953).
56. See Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at I11.
57. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
59. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
60. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 113.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. In Allied-Bruce Terminex, 513 U.S. 265, the Court adopted an expansive reading of
the section 2 language quoted by the respondent in Circuit City. Id. The Court in Circuit City
held that if the Respondent wished to argue that employment contracts are not covered by the
FAA, such argument would only be successful if done under the section 1 exemption. See id.
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argue that the language of the statute excludes all employment contracts
from enforcement under the FAA. The Court, however, used several
canons of construction to refute Adams's approach. In so doing, the
Court did not consider the legislative history of the FAA, explaining that
its decision was based on the text of the statute alone. 64
Various amici briefs submitted on behalf of both parties raised sev-
eral concerns. One suggested that by allowing the FAA to cover
employment contracts, the statute would "in effect pre-empt those state
employment laws which restrict or limit the ability of employees and
employers to enter into arbitration agreements."65 The Court disagreed,
noting that this issue had been specifically addressed in Southland Corp.
v. Keating,66 and again affirmed in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., v. Dob-
son.67 To conclude its extensive analysis of the Federal Arbitration Act,
the Court observed several of the benefits of arbitration, including lower
transactional costs for those involved.68 The Supreme Court noted that
by "agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, the party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolu-
tion in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum."69
GILMER VS. CIRCUIT CITY:. WHAT'S LEFT?
One scholar pointed out that before the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Gilmer, it had consistently refused to compel
employees to arbitrate statutory claims.70 After Gilmer, lower courts
continuously attempted to narrow the scope of the Gilmer holding
because it appeared to raise more questions than it answered and left
many individuals uncertain about the scope of the FAA. 7
The Supreme Court stated, however, that it has "been clear in
rejecting the supposition that the advantages of the arbitration process
somehow disappear when transferred to the employment context."72
One should question whether now, after Circuit City, there may still be
64. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 119.
65. Id. at 121-22.
66. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that Congress intended the FAA to apply in state courts
and to pre-empt state anti-arbitration laws to the contrary).
67. 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995). The Supreme Court in Circuit City distinguishes both Allied-
Bruce Terminix and Keating on the basis that both of those decisions concerned the application of
the FAA in a state court proceeding. See Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 122. Circuit City,
on the other hand, dealt specifically with the FAA's application in the federal court system. Id.
68. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 122-23.
69. Id. at 123 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
70. See Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 77, 78 (1996).
71. Id. at 81.
72. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 123; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 30-32 (1991).
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room for doubt. The Gilmer holding was interpreted in a variety of
ways: some courts more broadly, others more narrowly. Does Circuit
City leave any room for doubt? On the surface, the answer to this ques-
tion appears to be no. The Court has drawn a distinct line and employ-
ment contracts now fall within the reach of the FAA. It is yet to be
determined, however, how lower courts will respond to the Court's
rationale.
It appears that arbitration is no longer restricted to a debate on stat-
utory terminology. The Court has clearly defined the FAA's terms and
meanings.73 Any agreement not considered a transportation-employ-
ment contract is now fair game under the FAA. While one might sug-
gest that all previous controversies have lost their merit, many scholars
idealistically believed that the issue was resolved after the Gilmer deci-
sion in 1991.1' Just as there were many debates over Gilmer, it is likely
that Circuit City will also spark some controversy.
Some have already criticized the Circuit City decision for failing to
determine whether there are limits on mandatory arbitration agreements
that include federal statutory rights.75 It will be interesting to see
whether arbitration agreements are purely contractual or whether they
involve statutory rights that require regulation. Some examples of statu-
tory rights that might be at issue include those protected under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,76 the ADEA,77 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act.78 While this certainly is an understandable concern, the Circuit
City decision was an improper forum to raise the issue given the facts of
the case.7 9 The respondent, Saint Clair Adams, brought claims against
Circuit City under the California Fair Housing and Employment Act and
general tort claims under California law.80 These were state law claims
that did not involve federal statutes. As a result, one should hesitate to
criticize the Supreme Court for failing to address those statutory rights
that arise under federal statutes, given that the circumstances of Circuit
City revolved around state law.
No single Supreme Court decision will resolve every issue relating
to a given topic. Circuit City, however, is a positive development for
73. For a more complete analysis of the Court's reading of the FAA, see Circuit City Stores,
Inc., 532 U.S. 10 (1991); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); and
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
74. See Malin, supra note 70, at 88.
75. See James M. Sconzo & Michelle L. Treadwell, Have the Conflicts Over Arbitration
Finally Been Resolved?, 9 CONN. EMPL. L. LErrER 2 (2001).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2001).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2001).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2001).
79. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
80. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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those employers who wish to keep their employer/employee disputes out
of the courtroom. Employees, on the other hand, may have a different
response. While it is true there are benefits to mandatory arbitration,
there are arguments to be made that some claims belong in the hands of
a jury and deserve the proper formalities of the courtroom, including
those previously mentioned federal statutory rights. Because the Circuit
City decision will likely prompt an increase in the number of arbitration
clauses in employment contracts, employees must be prepared to defend
their claims carefully, or at least be cautious when agreeing to submit all
claims to mandatory arbitration.
THE LAW OUTSIDE OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT: CONSUMER
VERSUS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
Employment law will experience a revolution in contractual inter-
pretation just as consumer law has faced similar changes in tradition.
Originally, if a corporation violated the statutory rights of a consumer or
subjected the consumer to an invalid contract under federal or state law,
the consumer could recover damages from that corporation by filing a
lawsuit.8 As consumer law developed, however, many consumers were
forced to submit all claims to alternative dispute mechanisms after
unknowingly signing away their rights in an agreement to arbitrate. 82
These issues often arise when consumers sign mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses in adhesion contracts. Adhesion contracts are usually
offered on a "take it or leave it" basis, thus emphasizing the disparity in
bargaining power between consumers and larger corporations. 83  As
most consumers do not seek legal advice before entering such agree-
ments, they tend to miss the fine print within the contract, and ultimately
forfeit their right to a jury trial.84 One scholar stated that "[i]n consumer
contracts, one party in the transaction is always a company or organiza-
tion who is likely to be financially powerful" while "[t]he other party, an
individual ... who may be uneducated, inexperienced in business, eld-
erly, unable to read fine print .. . indigent and very desperate for
money. 85 In some consumer cases, courts have held that if an arbitra-
81. See Smith, supra note 23, at 1191; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII (granting individuals
the right to bring forth any claim before a jury).
82. See Smith, supra note 23, at 1191.
83. Id. at 1192; see also Alan S. Kaplinsky and Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration
Clause: Drafting and Implementation Issues Which Should Be Considered by a Consumer Lender,
SF81 ALI-ABA 215, 258 (2001).
84. See id. at 1192.
85. Smith, supra note 23, at 1226-27. The author goes on to note that these larger companies
also have a legal advantage because their own attorneys draft the clauses, which must then be
interpreted by the individuals. Id. Smith also suggests that these clauses become difficult for
consumers to interpret without the help of an attorney. Id.
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tion provision was not fully explained to the consumer, it may be unen-
forceable.86 Might this theory also apply in the employment context?
Employees likewise face disproportionate bargaining power and
similarly do not often seek the advice of legal counsel before signing
employment contracts. This creates comparable problems for consum-
ers and employees alike. One difference between the employee's cir-
cumstances and the consumer's situation, however, lies in the fact that
most consumer contracts are sent to the consumer through the mail.87
Therefore, it becomes a more pressing issue for companies to explain
arbitration clauses to consumers, because they are not in the presence of
a company representative when signing an agreement. Employees, on
the other hand, are likely to be at the place of business when signing an
employment application containing an arbitration clause. As a result, an
employer might later argue that the employee had ample opportunity to
question the terms of the agreement, making it difficult for an employee
to argue that she was unaware of the terms of the contract. Of greater
concern is the Supreme Court's holding in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto,88 which made it clear that arbitration clauses could not be
singled out for special treatment.89
In an analysis of consumer law, one scholar noted that while "Con-
gress intended for citizens to benefit from the FAA's enactment, large
corporations have used their legal, financial, and political resources to
turn the FAA into a shield against consumer lawsuits." 9° Even though
Congress has created numerous federal statutes to protect the rights of
consumers and employees, it still appears that something should be done
about the FAA to better protect the interests of the individuals it was
created to serve. Perhaps as consumer law has become so heavily regu-
lated,9' more protective legislation needs to be created on behalf of
employees as well. Hence it has been suggested that the FAA be
amended to curb the effects of unequal bargaining power given to larger
entities, such as corporations and employers.92
86. Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson, 256 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). The court held
that an arbitration agreement between an attorney and a client was unenforceable because the
client was not fully aware of the scope of the agreement. Id. For a more in-depth analysis of the
case, see Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer
Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1226, 1228
(2001).
87. Smith, supra note 23, at 1192.
88. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
89. See also Allied - Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). As a result of
the Court's holding in these cases, there is no legal requirement for employers to explain or point
out arbitration provisions. Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 10, at 220.
90. See Smith, supra note 23, at 1194-95.
91. Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 10, at 273.
92. See Smith, supra note 23, at 1246.
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Congress has the power to remedy this situation, but in doing so it
must not violate the United States Constitution.93 Time and time again,
however, employees and consumers have argued that enforcing arbitra-
tion clauses infringes upon their constitutional right to due process. 94 It
has been suggested that by preserving the benefits of arbitration and
removing a case from the courtroom, the constitutional protections of
the judicial process likewise are lost.95 One scholar also noted that
"arbitration represents an alternative litigation and offers a forum where
legal rights are not guaranteed and, in a very real sense, are de-empha-
sized." 96 Because arbitrators are not bound by legal rules, it is nearly
impossible to make a constitutional argument. 97
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
In terms of constitutional protections, many argue that employment
arbitration scores high relative to other areas of the law. It has been
proposed that in constitutional terms, arbitration between employers and
employees before a labor arbitrator has a "rich and successful history"
and is considered a "model of dispute resolution." '98 Due process, how-
ever, remains a serious concern for both employees and consumers.
One benefit of employment arbitration is the surplus of written
decisions.99 Commercial arbitration is lacking in this area, which makes
it difficult to analyze the arbitral proceeding in terms of fairness and
propriety.'00 Many employment and consumer decisions have turned on
the fairness of the proceedings,'' while other decisions have focused
more on the existence of "just cause" to support an arbitral award. 10 2 As
long as arbitration does not require the same formalities of the court-
93. See id. at 1245.
94. Id.
95. See Brunet, supra note 21, at 81.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 88.
98. Id. at 89; see also David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663, 745-51 (1973).
99. Id. at 89.
100. Brunet, supra note 21, at 96.
101. Id. at 92. The author refers to three cases in particular to highlight the notion of
"procedural fairness" to ensure that an individual's right to due process is properly protected. Id.
at 93. He refers to this concept in the labor arbitration context as "industrial due process." Id. He
goes on to note that "a full and fair investigation of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
employee conduct" is necessary, including "an opportunity for the employer [sic], before the
Company makes its final decision, to offer any denials, explanations or justifications which may
be relevant." Id. See also City of Detroit, 79-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8533, at 5358 (quoting
United Tel. Co. of Fla., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 443 (1973) (Murphy, Arb.)).
102. The author also noted that some arbitration clauses refer to a "just cause" clause. Id. at
95. These clauses often prompt the arbitrator to ensure fairness in the proceedings, and this
equates to due process. See Brunet, supra note 21, at 95.
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room, employees will have a difficult time trying to argue that their con-
stitutional rights are being abridged. As long as those rights are not
guaranteed during the proceedings, they cannot be infringed upon by the
simplicity of the process. Circuit City will not effectively change the
weight of the arguments made concerning the arbitral proceeding's con-
stitutionality. The Circuit City opinion focused on the scope of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, not on the constitutionality of arbitration.
CONSENT
On several occasions, lower courts have faced the issue of volun-
tary consent in arbitration agreements. If the consent is deemed inade-
quate, the clause itself may not be enforced. Consumers and employees
similarly will attempt to argue that they were not made aware of a mate-
rial fact in the contract, thus dissolving that portion of the agreement. 10 3
Some companies, however, may want to voluntarily disclose arbitration
provisions within employment contracts because it will be less likely
that the employee will later succeed in having the clause declared
unconscionable.' Further, it has been suggested that employees sign a
separate arbitration clause to ensure that the issue of consent will not
create future problems. 05
The Circuit City opinion did not address these subjects, and as of
the 2001 decision, the Supreme Court has failed to subsequently face
head-on the issues of notice and consent. Nevertheless, the problem
consistently arises in both consumer and employee disagreements.
Unfortunately, consumers have been unsuccessful in arguing that they
were unaware of an arbitration clause located in a signed contract. 10 6 As
a result, it does not seem likely that the argument will be more success-
ful when made by employees. Simply changing the circumstances of the
parties does not make an argument more plausible.
Consumers have also used fraudulent inducement as another
method of arguing the unconscionability of an arbitration provision. In
many instances, consumers have attempted to show that the alleged con-
sent was false because it was induced under deceitful circumstances. In
103. See Jeffrey J. Mayer & Theodore W. Seitz, Recognizing and Understanding Consent
Issues in Arbitration, 79 MIcH. Bus. L.J. 504, 506 (2000).
104. See Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration Clause: Drafting and
Implementation Issues Which Should be Considered by a Consumer Lender, SF81 ALI-ABA 215,
225 (2001).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 223. The authors list numerous case opinions that uniformly have denied
consumers the opportunity to argue that they were unaware of an arbitration clause within a
contract. Id. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Golenia v. Bob
Baker Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201 (D. Cal. 1996); Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d.
875 (1996).
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these instances, the Court has specifically stated that the fraud must be
shown to have occurred in reference to the arbitration provision.
0 7
As courts have not been sympathetic to consumers who attempt to
make these arguments, a great deal of criticism surrounds the concept of
consent and notice. One scholar has noted that the "freely consenting
party is a legal fiction," suggesting that courts should perhaps be more
cautious before denying an individual the ability to argue a consent
issue. 1 8 Where Federal law has failed to protect employees, states usu-
ally implement their own laws to protect both consumers and
employees.' 0 9
A problem arises when states attempt to infringe on the FAA. The
Supreme Court responded to this problem with its decision in Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto." There, the Court held that state laws
could not conflict with the FAA by singling out arbitration clauses."'
The Court continued to hold that courts could not invalidate arbitration
agreements under state laws that are only applicable to the arbitration
provision and not the entire contract.' 12 It appears that, whether one is a
consumer or an employee, if the party has agreed to a contract in writ-
ing, it will be difficult to show that he was unaware of the specific arbi-
tration clause. The individual, therefore, is left only a few defenses,
including fraud, duress, and lack of mutuality.
It seems the Court has glossed over the issue of consent and failed
to properly consider many of the elements that may come into play when
a potential employee signs an employment application. It is of the
utmost importance that the Court be more sympathetic to the vast dispar-
ity in bargaining power between employee and employer.
CONCLUSION
The use of arbitration for settling disputes is intended to make the
process of resolution more efficient, speedy, and cost effective." 3 To
ensure the process is fair, Congress has implemented statutory law to
regulate the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Because courts dis-
agreed on the scope and terms of the Federal Arbitration Act, the
107. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). In Prima
Paint, the Supreme Court held that if a contract is induced by fraud, this may not be enough to
invalidate the mandatory agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 403-04. The parties must show that that
consent to the arbitration provision was procured by fraudulence. Id.
108. See Mayer & Seitz, supra note 13, at 506.
109. Id.
110. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
Ill. Id. at 683.
112. Id. at 686-87.
113. See Brunet, supra note 21, at 82.
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Supreme Court attempted to clear the air regarding the limits of the
FAA. After ten years of speculation and disagreement since Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. While the latter opinion
addressed many of the concerns raised in the past years, it has still left
several vital issues in conflict. As a result, challenges to arbitration
clauses are likely to continue for some time.
By focusing on the Court's failure to address issues central to arbi-
tration, this is not necessarily a denunciation of the opinion in Circuit
City itself. It is merely a critique of the Supreme Court's inability to
answer pressing questions being debated in lower courts, particularly
those of constitutional due process and notice and consent. These topics
certainly are important to consumers, but likewise are valuable to
employees. Since many employees are unlikely to have the means to
hire independent counsel before signing an employment application or
contract, there is a great deal of room for employees to be taken advan-
tage of by larger, more powerful employers.
Public policy demands a sound method of resolution that will not
jeopardize the already small amount of bargaining power that employees
retain. Before anyone can claim success after the Circuit City decision it
must be recognized that the future of employer/employee relations is at
stake. More must be done to promote peaceful negotiations, fairness in
procedure, and sound decision-making.
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